Russia may become ungovernable and fall into chaos
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When the Russian president Vladimir Putin, invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022, set out to grab territory, deprive it of sovereignty, destroy the very idea of its national identity, and turn what was left of it into a failed state. After months of fierce Ukrainian resistance, its statehood and identity are stronger than ever, and everything that Putin intended to inflict on Ukraine is affecting his own country.
Putin’s war is turning Russia into a Failed state, with uncontrolled borders, private military formations, a population on the run, moral decline, and the possibility of civil conflict. And while Western leaders’ confidence in Ukraine’s ability to resist Putin’s terror has increased, Concerns are growing about Russia’s own ability to survive the war. It could become unruly and descend into chaos.
Let us consider its borders. The absurd and illegal annexation by Russia of four regions of Ukraine – Kherson, Donetsk, Luhansk and Zaporizhia – before it could even establish full control over them, makes it a state with illegitimate territories and a fluid border. “The Russian Federation, as we know it, is liquidating itself and entering a failed state phase,” says Ekaterina Schulmann, a political scientist. Her management, she points out, is incapable of carrying out its basic functions. The annexation will not deter Ukrainian forces, but it will set precedents for Russia’s own restive regions, including the North Caucasus republics, which are likely to head for the exit if the central government begins to loosen its grip.
Another characteristic of a state in decomposition is the loss of the monopoly on the use of physical force. Private armies and mercenaries, although officially prohibited in Russia, are flourishing. Evgeny Prigozhinan ex-con nicknamed “Putin’s chef” and front man for the wagner group, a private mercenary operation, he has been openly recruiting prisoners and offering them pardons in exchange for joining his forces. Wagner, he says, does not want to be “legalized” or integrated into the armed forces. The same could be said of the force controlled by Ramzan Kadyrov, former Chechen warlord and current President of Chechnya. Even the Russian government’s security agencies are increasingly serving their own corporate interests.

The Russian state is failing in the most basic function of all. Far from protecting the lives of his people, he represents the greatest threat for him, by using him as cannon fodder. On September 21, faced with military defeat on the battlefield in Ukraine, Putin ordered the mobilization of some 300,000 people. Poorly trained and ill-equipped, their only role is to hinder the advance of Ukrainian forces. It is unlikely that many of them will still be alive next year around this time.
The mobilization caused a much greater shock in Russia than the very beginning of the war. Some of its effects are already visible: recruiting centers were burned down and at least 300,000 people fled abroad (in addition to the 300,000 who left in the first weeks of the war). Most of them are young, educated and wealthy. The full impact of his march on the country’s economy and demography remains to be seen, but the social tension is increasing.
As urbanites flee, tens of thousands of their poorest compatriots are rounded up and sent to the trenches. By bringing home his “special military operation”, Putin has broken the fragile consensus whereby people agreed not to protest the war in exchange for being left alone. Now they are told to fight and die for the good of his regime.
Putin cannot win, but he cannot afford to end the conflict either. Perhaps he hopes that by getting so many people to collaborate in his war, and subjecting them to more of his poisonous fascist propaganda, he will be able to drag things out. If he succeeds, or if the flow of body bags, coupled with elite discontent, causes his downfall, he will determine how many more will die and how far Russia will fall.

What did you say Alexei Navalny, imprisoned Russian opposition leader, in one of his court appearances: “We have not been able to prevent the catastrophe and we no longer slide, but fly towards it. The only question will be how strongly Russia will bottom out and whether it will crumble.” Next year will give some indication of the answer to that bleak question.
*Arkady Ostrovsky is Russia editor of The Economist
© 2022, The Economist Newspaper Limited. All rights reserved.
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