After nearly two months of hostilities between the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and Hezbollah in Lebanon, the two sides have agreed to a 60-day ceasefire that will allow many civilians forced to flee to return to their homes in southern Lebanon. battle.
The terms of the agreement were similar to the last time Israel and Hezbollah clashed in 2006. Israeli soldiers will return to their country across the border. Hezbollah, for its part, will withdraw all its fighters from the area south of the Litani River, the former “Blue Line” border established by the United Nations in 2000 and intended to create a buffer zone between Israel and Lebanon. . Monitored by United Nations peacekeepers.
But since this approach has not been effective in maintaining peace in the past, what are the chances of it being sustained now? Both countries have already accused each other of ceasefire violations. John Strawson, an expert on Middle East politics at the University of East London, discusses some of the key issues.
Has Israel succeeded in neutralizing Hezbollah?
Israel will count its 2024 war against Hezbollah as a major success. The IDF had been planning this since the end of the 2006 war, which resulted in large numbers of Israeli casualties and failed to seriously weaken Hezbollah.
It is clear that Israel at this time had excellent intelligence and the ability to act accordingly; This was already evident in the operation, a few days before Israeli troops entered southern Lebanon, in which they detonated pagers and walkie talkie
In a two-month conflict, he managed to eliminate Hezbollah’s leadership, including Hassan Nasrallah. It has destroyed several military sites near the Israeli border and damaged most of Hezbollah’s weapons, including strategic missiles.Israel’s ground campaign has been more successful than many analysts (including myself) had anticipated, and has resulted in fewer casualties than in 2006.
But I wouldn’t say that Hezbollah has been neutralized, because even after two months and all these Israeli advances, it was still able to fire 200 to 250 missiles at Israel last weekend, and oil in the last week of the war. Aviv was also forced. Operations at Ben Gurion Airport suspended.
But Hezbollah is not the same organization it was on October 8, 2023, when it began attacking Israel in support of the atrocities committed by Hamas the previous day. The fact that it entered into an armistice with Israel before the end of the Gaza War underlines that its lesser military capabilities are reflected in more modest political goals.
Now what is Israel’s war objective in Gaza?
Benjamin Netanyahu’s biggest achievement in terms of ceasefire is separating the Gaza war from the Lebanese front. He sees this as a major gap in the Iranian axis of resistance. The Israeli Prime Minister is now going to have to take important decisions regarding the Gaza war. He has always said that his goal is complete victory over Hamas, and in the ceasefire with Hezbollah, Netanyahu has perhaps shown that his goal of “complete victory” depends entirely on his definition of what that means.
In short, Hamas has been virtually defeated and its leadership destroyed. I think he will be completely unable to organize another operation in the style of 7 October. Their weapons are in short supply and their forces are disorganized. This does not mean that he is unable to carry out continued guerrilla tactics to kill Israeli forces, but he will feel more isolated after the ceasefire with Hezbollah.
Hamas leaders inside and outside Gaza – most of them in Turkey these days, as Qatar has abandoned its role in peace talks – will question Tehran’s resolve, especially since it has welcomed the ceasefire.
Egypt has launched a new plan for a more limited ceasefire in Gaza. This would last for a month or two and would be based on a reduction in Israeli military activity, a phased return of some hostages and an increase in aid along with the reopening of the Rafah border crossing between Egypt and Gaza. He does not expect Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza.
Not only has this initiative been coordinated with the current US administration, but Egypt is apparently also in contact with Donald Trump. Hamas may have to accept the new reality that it is alone.
The deal could be attractive to Netanyahu because it opens up his options regarding Gaza’s long-term future.
How does Trump’s re-election impact all this?
The Egyptian government’s contacts with the incoming Trump administration are undoubtedly aimed at putting pressure on the Israelis. Egypt’s energetic president, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, was one of the first leaders to congratulate the US president-elect and his voice will undoubtedly carry more weight in a Trump-led White House than Joe Biden’s.
But it is unclear whether Trump will support Egypt’s plan. The recently re-elected US President wants to be seen as Israel’s great defender. But at the same time he would like to go down in history as the person who brought peace to the Middle East. And, as we know, he declares himself against “eternal wars.”
I suspect that Trump’s support for Israel has more to do with his strategic concerns about the Iranian nuclear program than his affection for the Jewish state. He may be interested in coming to power with a ceasefire in both Lebanon and Gaza so he can focus on Iran.
Is the Abraham Accords on the agenda again?
It is a remarkable fact that despite the 13-month war, the major agreement states have maintained their relations with Israel. It is also true that talks have continued between the United States and Saudi Arabia on energy and strategy, including the possibility of the Saudis recognizing Israel’s statehood.
These agreements were among the great foreign policy initiatives of the first Trump administration. Israel signed agreements to normalize relations with the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan. Saudi Arabia was expected to be among the Arab countries to follow suit, and the Biden administration made strong efforts to ensure this. But the October 7 Hamas attack and the subsequent conflict have put an end to that idea (at least temporarily).
But Trump’s cordial relationship with the Saudis during his first term is likely to resume after his inauguration on January 20. It is quite possible that if a peace agreement were reached in Gaza, we could see progress on this issue, leaving Iran severely isolated in the region.