European Court of Human Rights supports ban on animal sacrifice with kosher and jalal rituals

The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), based in Strasbourg, supports the prohibition of animal sacrifices with kosher and jalal rituals used for human consumption among Jewish and Muslim believers. The decision was taken this Tuesday in response to a lawsuit filed by 13 Belgian citizens and seven non-governmental organizations from the same country, representing Muslim communities in Belgium, as well as Muslim religious authorities and Belgian citizens of the Jewish sect living in Belgium. Used to represent.

The ruling declared that there was no violation of Article 9 (freedom of religion), nor of Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) of the European Convention on Human Rights. The Court of Justice, based in Strasbourg, considers that by adopting the orders in question, which had the effect of banning the slaughter of animals without prior stunning in the Flemish and Walloon regions, while permitting reversible stunning for ritual sacrifices, the authorities Had not exceeded its margin. In case appreciated.

In this sense, according to the ECHR, they had adopted a measure justified in principle and which could be considered proportionate to the objective of protecting animal welfare as an element of “public morality”.

Thus, the ECtHR notes that this was the first time that it addressed the question of whether the protection of animal welfare could be linked to one of the objectives of Article 9 of the Convention (freedom of religion).

case of belgium

The case responds to the fact that Belgium passed a law on the protection and welfare of animals in 1986 which establishes that, except in cases of force majeure or necessity, vertebrate animals may be slaughtered without anesthetizing or stunning them. Cannot be given. However, this requirement did not apply to sacrifices for religious rites.

In 2014, following a reform, animal welfare – which until then had been the responsibility of the federal state – became a regional competence. Following this reform, the Flemish Region (2017) and the Walloon Region (2018) abolished the exception that allowed the ritual sacrifice of animals without beheading.

The exception provided by the 1986 law was still applicable in the Brussels-Capital Region, as the Brussels Parliament, in 2022, rejected a proposal to amend the 1986 law.

Some of the plaintiffs in the present case before the ECHR requested judicial review of the Flemish and Walloon orders before the Belgian Constitutional Court, which referred a number of preliminary questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in 2019, in particular this on whether slaughter without stunning was compatible with EU law in the light of religious freedom provided for in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.

In 2020, the CJEU delivered a ruling in which it held that EU law does not prevent a Member State’s law requiring, in the context of a ritual sacrifice, a reversible stunning procedure that cannot lead to the death of the animal. ,

Subsequently, in 2021, the Constitutional Court rejected the affected plaintiffs’ appeals. The plaintiffs complained to the court that the ban on ritual sacrifice of animals without prior stunning under the orders of the Flemish and Walloon regions violated their right to religious freedom: they alleged that Jewish and Muslim believers would find it difficult, If not impossible, then sacrifice animals or obtain meat from such animals as per the rules of your religion.

The applicants alleged that the restrictions in question constituted an unreasonable interference with their right to respect for their religious freedom and complained that they had been discriminated against in respect of their religious freedom. The claims were filed with the European Court of Human Rights in March 2022.

right to religious freedom

The Court found that the applicants’ freedom of religion had been interfered with and that this was determined by law, namely the Flemish and Walloon Decrees.

On whether the intervention pursues a legitimate objective, the Court stated that this was the first time that it had to rule on the question of whether the protection of animal welfare could be linked to one of the objectives set out in Article 9 of the Convention. Could. ,

There was no explicit reference to the protection of animal welfare in the list of legitimate purposes in Article 9 of the Convention that could justify interference with the freedom to manifest one’s religion.

However, the Court held that the protection of public morals referred to in Article 9 of the Convention cannot be understood as solely aimed at protecting human dignity in the field of interpersonal relations.

The Convention was not indifferent to the living environment of the persons and especially animals falling under its protection, the protection of which had already been examined by the Court.

As a result, the Convention cannot be interpreted as promoting the full protection of the rights and freedoms contained therein without taking into account the suffering of animals. Underscoring that the concept of “ethics” is intrinsically evolutionary, the Court saw no reason to contradict the CJEU and the Constitutional Court, which had found that the protection of animal welfare was a moral value that contemporary democratic societies were valuing. Were.

It follows that the Court may, as in the present case, take this fact into account while examining the validity of the purpose pursued by the restriction on the freedom to manifest one’s religion.

As a result, the Court held that the protection of animal welfare can be linked to the concept of public morality, which is a legitimate objective within the meaning of Article 9 of the Convention.

On whether intervention was necessary in a democratic society, the Court considered that in circumstances such as the present case, which concerns, on the one hand, relations between the State and religions and, on the other hand, no clear disclosure within States. The consensus but nevertheless showed a progressive development in favor of greater protection of animal welfare, with national authorities certainly enjoying a margin of appreciation that could not be narrower.

In this regard, the quality of parliamentary and judicial control of the necessity of the measure taken at national level is of particular importance, especially in determining the application of the relevant margin of appreciation.

With regard to the quality of parliamentary control, the Court of Justice says that these decrees were adopted after extensive consultation with representatives of various religious groups, veterinarians and animal protection associations and that in turn considerable efforts were made by the federal, Flemish and Walloon legislatures. Were. Over a long period of time to reconcile the objectives of promoting animal welfare and respecting religious freedom as best as possible.

With regard to jurisdictional review of interference, the Court stated that dual review was conducted prior to its own investigation under the Convention.

The CJEU held that applying a reversible and non-fatal shocking method was consistent with Article 10 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (freedom of thought, conscience and religion).

Secondly, the Constitutional Court confirmed the constitutionality of the two decrees on the basis of reasoning which, in the Court’s opinion, could not be considered superficial in the light of the requirements of Article 9 of the Convention.

The court said both orders were based on the scientific consensus that pre-stunning is the best means of reducing the suffering of the animal at the time of slaughter. He saw no compelling reason to question this conclusion.

The Court further noted that the Flemish and Walloon legislators had sought a proportionate alternative to the obligation of prior stunning, since the orders provided that, if the animals were slaughtered according to special methods required for religious rites, the use The amazing procedure performed will be reversible. , without causing the death of the animal.

With regard to the plaintiffs’ complaint that it would be difficult if not impossible to obtain meat in accordance with their religious beliefs, the Court noted that the Flemish and Walloon regions did not ban the consumption of meat from other regions or countries where stunning animals were previously slaughtered. There was no legal requirement to do so and the plaintiff had not demonstrated that access to the said meat had become more difficult.

The Court concludes that, by adopting decisions prohibiting the slaughter of animals without prior stunning in the Flemish and Walloon regions, while prescribing reversible stunning for ritual sacrifices, the national authorities have not exceeded the margin of appreciation that they are recognized in the present case.

They had adopted a measure that was justified in principle and could be considered proportionate to the objective pursued, namely the protection of animal welfare as an aspect of “public morality”. Therefore, Article 9 of the Convention was not violated.

With regard to the applicants’ status as Jewish and Muslim believers compared to hunters and fishermen, the Court held that they had not demonstrated that they were in the same or similar situation as hunters and fishermen.

As the CJEU noted, because farm animals were ritually slaughtered, their slaughter occurred in a different context from the slaughter of wild animals, which were slaughtered in the context of recreational hunting and fishing.

With regard to the plaintiff’s status as a Jewish and Muslim believer compared to the general population – which was not subject to religious dietary regulations – the Court noted that there was no provision for an optional stunning procedure in the case of particular methods of sacrifice specifically prescribed. Orders were provided for. By religious rites: Orders provided for reversible and non-fatal stunning.

Therefore, in the present case we cannot talk about lack of difference in the way different situations are dealt with.

As far as the position of the Jewish plaintiffs as compared to the Muslims is concerned, the Court considers, like the Constitutional Court, the mere fact that the dietary rules of the Jewish religious community and the Muslim religious community were of different nature. It was not enough to consider that people of Jewish and Muslim faith were in different contextual positions with respect to the controversial measure regarding religious freedom.