Haaretz investigation reveals Israeli army fired on its own soldiers during Hamas attacks

Eight months later, the Haaretz newspaper, citing an anonymous police source, reported that fire by Israeli helicopters against “Hamas terrorists” may have also hit “some participants in the (music) festival known as Nova”, one of its journalists said. Now the newspaper is publishing the biggest investigation ever into what happened on October 7. Around 1,200 people were killed that day and another 250 were abducted and taken to the Gaza Strip.

According to documents and testimonies from Israel Defense Forces (IDF) soldiers, middle-ranking and senior officers compiled by the newspaper, during the chaos that followed Hamas’s “Al Aqsa Storm” operation, Israeli military commanders may have activated the so-called “Hannibal Directive” in a general manner and at various points along the border, which defends the use of force by the military to prevent its soldiers from falling into the hands of the enemy, even at the cost of their lives or those of civilians.

Thus, at 11:22 a.m., about five hours after the Hamas incursion and when the Israeli army already knew that its fighters had kidnapped dozens of people, an order came to the Gaza division: no vehicles could return to the Strip. “Everyone knew then that those vehicles could be carrying kidnapped civilians or soldiers. Everyone knew what it meant to not allow any vehicles to return to Gaza,” a military source told the Israeli newspaper. So the ban on shooting anything suspicious near the border fence was open, although it is still unknown whether civilians and soldiers came under Israeli fire, with both being hit.

Another defense official familiar with the October 7 operation, quoted by Haaretz, pointed to serious information failures about what was really happening outside Israeli military checkpoints in the area, which were the first targets of Hamas militants. “Everyone was shocked by the number of terrorists who entered the base. We did not plan such an attack even in our worst nightmares. No one had any idea how many people were kidnapped, or where the army forces were located. There was mass hysteria and decisions were made without any verified information,” he added.

shooting at military targets at will

According to information obtained by Haaretz, the Hannibal Protocol, validated by the army, was used in at least three military outposts, including the Reem base, which housed the Gaza Division headquarters, and the Nahal Oz outpost, where female observers were stationed who were alerting their commanders about unusual activities on the other side of the border with Gaza.

At 10:19 a.m. a disturbing report arrived: a Zik – an attack drone – had struck the base, and those living there were warned to stay inside the military compound, as a special forces commando would enter a few minutes later. The army still does not know if any of its members were injured by the drone fire, but “whoever made such a decision knew that our fighters in the area could also be attacked,” says one of the sources consulted by the Tel newspaper. Aviv.

Where so many precautions were not taken was early in the morning at the Erez border crossing, the terminal that separated Israel from Gaza before October 7, more akin to a small airport than a border crossing intended to isolate a poor region like Gaza. “Hannibal in Erez”, “send a Zik”, he ordered from Gaza Division headquarters at 7:15 a.m. when he received news of a possible kidnapping of a man posted at the Erez pass. The meaning of the order was clear, this was the first, but there would be more. The Hamas infiltration had just begun.

Potential use against civilians

As the hours passed and as the day progressed, Israeli army commanders began to realize the magnitude of the Hamas attack, which meant a prompt and effective deployment of their forces to protect the kibbutzim near the border fence. This was the case of the Nir Oz community, where the first troops arrived when the Hamas militants had already left, leaving a trail of blood. 20 of its 400 residents were killed and another 80, a third of the initial 240 hostages, were kidnapped and taken to Gaza.

But there were other kibbutzim like Biri, where the army arrived and where, according to Haaretz, its commander Hannibal could enforce the directive. One of these cases occurred in the home of Pessi Cohen, a member of that community. Hamas militants detained 14 people in his home. 13 of them died, reportedly as a result of fire from an Israeli tank.

In the coming weeks, the IDF is expected to publish the results of an investigation into the incident, which points directly at Brigadier General Barak Hiram, who was responsible for the operation in Biri on October 7. “Did he order the tanks to advance even at the expense of the civilians present in the kibbutz house, as he declared in an interview with the New York Times?” the authors of the Haaretz investigation ask.

In the more than nine months since October, army spokesmen have always denied that their commanders gave the order to implement the controversial military protocol during the events of October 7 and whose use would have been described in some quarters as “illegal, immoral and terrible,” according to the philosopher who helped write the Israel Defense Forces code of conduct, Asa Kasher.

Drafted in 1986 after the capture of three Israeli soldiers by the Lebanese militia Hezbollah, the directive, whose full text has never been published, was officially rescinded in 2016 by then IDF Chief of Staff Gadi Eizenkot. Since then it has never been known which protocol replaced it, but its use, under any nomenclature, remains applicable, seems beyond doubt.