Russia learns from military mistakes in Ukraine and improves its military international
The Russian army is developing at a rapid pace. 2022 is far away, the first year of the war, when Ukrainian officers and Western military analysts were astonished by the attacking troops’ lack of preparation, material and tactics. It was largely thanks to this that the Ukrainian Armed Forces were able to push back the enemy in a number of provinces from Kiev to Kherson. But today the reality is different. Gen. Christopher Cavoli, commander of U.S. forces in Europe, said April 11, “The Russian military has demonstrated over the past year a quick ability to learn and adapt on the battlefield, both tactically and technologically.” The Kremlin’s military power, Cavoli said, “has become a learning structure that has little to do with the forces that invaded Ukraine two years ago.”
Ukrainian troops on the Avdiivka front in Donetsk province reported to EL PAÍS on April 22 about Russian superiority in the region. One of the testimonies concluded, “They are getting bigger and better, and with better weapons.” The war has resulted in thousands of casualties in the Russian military, in addition to thousands of destroyed armour, artillery and air vehicles, but the reality is that the Kremlin is more powerful militarily today than when the invasion began. Cavoli provided clear data in his appearance before the United States Senate on April 11: “Russia is on track to produce or improve approximately 1,200 new tanks per year and 3 million artillery shells and missiles per year.” The United States and more than 32 NATO countries combined. The general confirmed that “Whatever the outcome of the war, the Russian army will be larger, more lethal and aggressive toward the West than when the invasion began.”
Cavoli adds a worrying aspect for the Atlantic Alliance, and that is the technological leap taken by Moscow’s weapons: “Russia has responded to international sanctions by adopting theft and importation strategies that have prevented it from acquiring key electronic elements and machinery. Is allowed. This has allowed Russia to continue investing in excellent, highly developed weapons to match the American strategic advantage.
Electronic warfare, beyond Ukraine
the new York Times On 23 April it was confirmed that Russia has new electronic warfare systems that divert the trajectories of American Hummers missiles. Newspaper Pravda On April 25, an analysis of the aggressor’s progress in electronic warfare to disrupt the communications of Ukrainian drones was published: “In stationary electronic warfare equipment and trenches, Russia is far ahead of Ukraine,” said military analyst Maria Berlinska. In 2023, Russian troops adopted three models of jammers to shoot down drones from trenches, the Harpoon, Python and Strizh, which are now in widespread use.
Ukraine was superior in the adaptation of civilian drones to the battlefield until 2023, but until the current Russian dominance, the tables are progressively turning in the number and quality of equipment. Pravda He claimed that in the last three months the attacker has doubled the number of drones on the front.
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The Russian Air Force has added more lethal weapons to its bombing raids this year. Iranian Shaheed bomb drones have been improved to be more nimble, carry a 90 kg explosive payload and carry a camera that transmits images and data to their base. New rockets have also entered service, such as the Kh-69 cruise missile – notably used in the current Russian campaign against the Ukrainian energy system –, the Zircon hypersonic missile and the FAB-1500 guided aerial bomb, which since February In service to wreak havoc on the enemy. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced on April 23 that his troops will soon receive the first units of S-500 Prometheus defense systems, the fifth generation of Russian anti-aircraft batteries with a range of up to 600 kilometers against hypersonic missiles. But it is still too early to know the effectiveness of the Prometheus system, which came into force after years of delay.
In Russia it is also emphasized that only precision missiles, not tanks, can tilt the war to one side or the other. “It’s a race. “Whoever produces more high-precision weapons will be able to maneuver out of the current situational impasse,” says Ruslan Pukhov, director of the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST), a research institute, in his Moscow office. would be able.” , Independent military studies whose opinions matter to the Russian high command. In his opinion, “concentrating on the production of obsolete tanks, artillery and shells will not be enough for Russia to achieve significant military success.”
The Ukrainian high command has withdrawn its American Abrams or German front-line Leopard tanks due to sensitivity to drones. “Drones are especially dangerous in open fields. As soon as you reach the city, the urban environment protects you as you move forward. “Thanks to him and the use of bombs directed against the fortifications the Russians were able to capture Avdeevka,” says the director of CAST. The Pentagon and Kiev insist that the defeat at Avdiivka in the Donetsk province last February was caused primarily by a shortage of ammunition and weapons on the Ukrainian side.
The revolution of recent months has been that of guided bombs. In fact, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has asked the West for more anti-aircraft weapons to counter the new “Russian terror”: the UMPK, a system that attaches to free-fall bombs and directs them with pinpoint accuracy against targets. Guides to glide, without exposing themselves to the enemy from the aircraft from which they are fired upon.
Russia designed its own UMPK bombs last decade, but had downplayed them until it had to resort to them earlier this year, as its doctrine placed greater emphasis on the development of its aircraft. “To everyone’s surprise,” says Pukhov, “anti-aircraft guns in this war have managed to intercept and keep aviation at a distance.” Smart bombs are capable of destroying enemy fortifications and Moscow produces increasingly powerful explosives. The Russian Defense Ministry announced the M54 in January, a new UMPK system that has not only wings and tail, but also a front fairing that improves the aerodynamics of the FAB-1500 bombs.
Pukhov: Ukrainian front resembles the Spanish Civil War
Director of CAST (Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies) says, “This war has shown us that in Europe we had forgotten what war is like, no one believed that a conflict with so many people and weapons could last for years. can be OK.” ), from the center of Moscow in his office. Ruslan Puzov emphasizes that everyone has paid too much attention to the military lessons of the United States in Iraq, Yugoslavia or Libya, when it was in the war with Iran and Iraq (1980-1988) and even the Spanish It’s like a civil war.
“A long positional front emerged in Spain, with relatively low troop density on both sides, much lower than in the World Wars, and weapons not powerful enough to break defensive lines. Franco was able to solve this problem with small crushing attacks and the concentration of aviation in his attacks, which would be repelled by the Germans with blitzkrieg,” explains Puzov.
In 1938 the Ukrainian and Spanish fronts were similar in extension, about 2,000 kilometers, and the number of combatants was also similar. Vladimir Putin announced in December that about 617,000 Russian troops were taking part in his invasion. There are 900,000 people in the Ukrainian armed forces, and more than half a million of these people may be serving at the front. According to the Spanish Civil WarAccording to historian Hugh Thomas, the Republicans and Francoists had between 450,000 and 600,000 troops in 1938.
“The Republicans had a chance until the autumn of 1937,” says Pukhov, “but they could not solve the problem of the positional struggle and failed in all their attacks. Prolonged fighting in positions with no prospects of success led to their disintegration: they understood that they could still resist for five months or ten years, but their objective was lost.
Russia is also facing a similar problem. “The Russian army was not designed for such an intensive meat grinder,” admits the director of CAST, although he emphasizes that Russia “will recruit more people and neither them, nor others, Neither the civilians nor the army will be spared.” “This is the Russian way of waging war. And yes, it is bloody and brutal,” he warns. However, both countries have problems recruiting people: “They are two modern post-industrial societies.”
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(Tagstotranslate) Russian war in Ukraine